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BIS Papers No 115 Multi-CBDC arrangements and the future of cross- border payments by Raphael Auer, Philipp Haene and Henry Holden Monetary and Economic Department March 2021 JEL classification: E42, E51, E58, F31, G21, G28, L50, O32. Keywords: central bank digital currency, CBDC, multi- CBDC arrangements, mCBDC, mCBDC bridge, cross- border payments, payment systems, central banking, digital currency, stablecoins, remittances.The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. This publication is available on the BIS website (bis). Bank for International Settlements 2021. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISSN 1609-0381 (print) ISBN 92-9131-461-9 (printBIS Papers No 115 i Multi-CBDC arrangements and the future of cross- border payments Raphael Auer, Philipp Haene and Henry Holden 1 Abstract Cross-border payments are inefficient, and technology could play a role in making them better. One means could be through interoperating central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), forming multi-CBDC (mCBDC) arrangements. This paper explores dimensions of payment system interoperability, how they could feature in mCBDC arrangements and where potential benefits lie. These benefits are especially relevant for emerging market economies poorly served by the existing correspondent banking arrangements. Yet competing priorities and history show that these benefits will be difficult to achieve unless central banks incorporate cross-border considerations in their CBDC development from the start and coordinate internationally to avoid the mistakes of the past. 1 We thank Morten Bech, Ulrich Bindseil, Stijn Claessens, Emma Claggett, Benot Cur, Ben Dyson, Leonardo Gambacorta, Jon Frost, Brian Lam, Ross Leckow, Benjamin Mller, Tara Rice, Adolfo Sarmiento, Tres Wehrli and the participants of the BIS-CPMI-IMF cross-border CBDC workshop on 1617 December 2020 for valuable comments, and Giulio Cornelli and Alan Villegas for excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the BIS.BIS Papers No 115 iii Table of Contents Introduction . 1 Cross-border payment frictions and interoperability a primer . 2 Cross-border CBDCs: three conceptual approaches . 4 Enhancing compatibility of CBDCs . 4 Linking multiple CBDC systems . 5 Integrating multiple CBDCs in a single mCBDC system . 7 International coordination to harness the potential of mCBDC arrangements . 9 Compatibility . . 10 Coordination . . 11 Concluding thoughts . . 12 References . . 14 Previous volumes in this series . . 17BIS Papers No 115 1 Introduction Cross-border payments are ever more vital for economies, especially transactions underpinning tourism, e-commerce and remittances, which have grown substantially over the last decade (Cur (2019) and Graph 1, left-hand panel). Yet such payments are often slow, opaque and expensive. 2 Improvement is a priority for globally coordinated policy efforts, and a multi-year G20 “roadmap” is coordinating efforts (G20 FMCBG (2020) and CPMI (2020). As well as driving improvements to current systems, central banks are exploring the opportunities central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) might bring to cross-border payments (Carstens (2020 (a, b), 2021), Group of central banks (2020) and Graph 1, right-hand panel). CBDCs are a widely researched new form of digital central bank money, which are just starting to be issued and piloted in some jurisdictions. 3 Improving cross-border payments efficiency is an important motivation for research (right-hand panel). This paper models the “multi-CBDC arrangements” in which future cross-border, cross-currency CBDC payments could flow. It considers the potential benefits and the 2 Remittances to low- and middle-income countries stood at $551 billion in 2019 (IMF (2020b). Fees from these payments averaged 6.8% (World Bank (2020), ie 35 billion USD. 3 Boar et al (2020) provide an overview of research, motivation and likelihood of issuance from central banks. Auer et al (2020) examine the drivers and take stock of current design approaches. Recently, the Central Bank of Bahamas has issued a CBDC (see Central Bank of The Bahamas (2019) for a description). Cross-border payments efficiency as a motivation for CBDC issuance Graph 1 Globalisation of economic retail activity Cross-border payments as a motive for issuance 1 USD trn 2000 = 100 Distribution 1 Importance of enhancing cross-border payments efficiency as a motive for CBDC issuance in a survey of 66 central banks. The distribution ranges from 1 (not so important) to 4 (very important). 2 The dots indicate the average. The range indicates the interquartile range. Sources: C Boar, H Holden and A Wadsworth (2020): “Impending arrival a sequel to the survey on central bank digital currency”, BIS Papers, no 107, January; Universal Postal Union; World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide; authors calculations. 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.0 400 320 240 160 80 0 19 17 15 13 11 09 07 05 03 01 International tourism expenditure Migrants remittance inflows to EMDEs Migrants remittance inflows, total Lhs: Number of international dispatched parcels Rhs: 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 Wholesale CBDC Retail CBDC AEs EMEs Payments efficiency (cross-border): 22 BIS Papers No 115 international cooperation required to make them happen. The different models are CBDC variants of the “multi-currency cross-border” payment systems and arrangements as defined in the taxonomy developed by Bech et al (2020). The models are conceptual and so the macroeconomic and cross-border legal aspects that would need to be considered as part of any practical development are not covered in this paper. 4 Multi-CBDC arrangements are preferable to proposals that involve the creation of a global private sector global stablecoin. 5 Instead, they look to foster a diversity of convertible national currencies and strengthen monetary sovereignty in the digital age. 6 We begin with a primer on the inherent frictions in cross-border and cross- currency payments and the different dimensions of interoperability for payment systems. Through this lens, three different mCBDC arrangements are outlined, together with their likely hurdles and opportunities (based on experience and experimentation to date). We close with thoughts on how mCBDC arrangements relate to monetary sovereignty and how international cooperation on development and experimentation can help realise those opportunities. Cross-border payment frictions and interoperability a primer Multi-currency, cross-border payments are more complex than their domestic counterparts. Settlement in different currencies adds to risks and costs (CPMI (2018) and Bech and Holden (2019). Today, most cross-border payments are settled through correspondent banking arrangements. In these, currency conversion typically involves several parties, ie smaller payments will be netted and hedged in wholesale markets by banks. 7 Domestic payment systems naturally prioritise local participants in their design (eg using domestic message standards and having opening hours that correspond to local financial markets), and compliance and regulatory standards can differ, adding frictions and risks. Although improvements are under way, frictions along particular corridors remain. These frictions add up to more risks and operational complexities to manage (Graph 2). 8 4 See International Monetary Fund (2020a) for a review of macroeconomic implications and Ferrari et al (2020) for an examination of international spillovers. 5 See Libra Association (2019 and 2020) for a proposal and Adrian (2019), Carney (2019), Brunnermeier et al. (2019), and Fats and Weder di Mauro (2019) for evaluations. 6 See G7 Working Group on Stablecoins (2019), FSB (2012b), IOSCO (2020), Arner et al. (2020), Adachi et al (2020) for a discussion of regulatory issues, Frost et al (2020) for a discussion of the historical context, and BIS (2018) and ECB (2020) for the technological underpinnings of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins. 7 There are ways to make conversion more efficient and tailored (eg “matching” customers to reduce the size of net positions). Yet there will always be a net position which will incur exchange rate and settlement risk that needs to be managed. 8 See also FSB (2020a) and Coelho et al (2020).BIS Papers No 115 3 “Interoperability” between payment systems can help reduce frictions. It is a broad term, potentially incorporating any characteristics of systems that could help them exchange information. 9 Today, payment systems achieve cross-border and cross-currency interoperability in three different ways: 1. Compatible standards (eg similar regulatory frameworks, market practices, messaging formats and data requirements). 2. Interlinking systems via technical interfaces, common clearing mechanisms or related schemes. 3. By establishing a single multi-currency payment system. Payment systems and payment arrangements are different. Systems feature an operator which maintains a single rulebook and formally controls access to the entire system. Arrangements lack this single unifying agreement. Through use of compatible features and interlinkages, separate payment systems can interoperate to form multi- currency payment arrangements. 10 The frictions present in todays cross-border, cross-currency payment systems and the ways domestic systems can interoperate are well understood. For cross- border interoperability in CBDC systems, research is in its infancy. Yet there are several studies on the wider challenges facing CBDC-based payment systems, and a broad 9 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines interoperability as the “capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those units” (ISO (2015). 10 More formally, a payment system is a set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants, where the system includes the participants and the operating entity (CPMI-IOSCO (2012). A payment arrangement is a broader term including decentralised networks of participants who collaborate to send and receive payments without a multilateral or overarching agreement (eg a correspondent banking arrangement). Frictions in current correspondent banking arrangements Graph 2 Source: Authors elaboration.4 BIS Papers No 115 outline of what domestic systems could look like is now possible (Group of central banks (2020) and Auer and Bhme (2020a,b and 2021). Cross-border CBDCs: three conceptual approaches To date, only one central bank has issued a CBDC, 11 and so envisaging multi-CBDC arrangements is necessarily a conceptual undertaking. Conceptually, the three dimensions of payment system interoperability can be stylised in three models: compatible CBDC systems (model 1), interlinked CBDC systems (model 2) and a single system for mCBDC (model 3). The latest CBDC research and historical experience is viewed through this conceptual framing, to provide some practical considerations on the possible benefits and challenges. Enhancing compatibility of CBDCs Through compatible standards, payment systems can reduce frictions and barriers to a diversity of privately offered cross-border and cross-currency services. Diversity, choice and competition make cross-border payments quicker, cheaper and more transparent (CPMI (2018). The CBDC design stocktake of Auer et al (2020) shows that in many jurisdictions, design efforts concentrate on hybrid CBDC architectures (see Auer and Bhme (2020a,b), in which the private sector conducts all customer-facing transactions. Given such “tiering” in compatible CBDC systems, a first mCBDC arrangement would probably look very similar to traditional payment systems (Graph 3). 11 The Central Bank of The Bahamas started issuing its Sand Dollar in October 2020 (Central Bank of the Bahamas (2019). Model 1: mCBDC arrangements based on compatible CBDC systems Graph 3 Source: Authors elaboration.BIS Papers No 115 5 In CBDC just as with any payment means common technical standards, such as message formats, cryptographic techniques, data requirements and user interfaces can reduce the operational burden of participating in multiple systems. Aligned legal, regulatory and supervisory standards can simplify know-your-customer and transaction monitoring processes. However, without coordinated policy action, compatibility takes time. Experience has shown it takes years to coordinate participants in complex markets to move to common message standards (eg ISO 20022) or align legal frameworks. Legal and regulatory compatibility are sometimes cited as the greatest source of friction for cross-border payments by banks and payment service providers (CPMI (2018). Efforts are under way to reduce unintentional barriers (G20 FMCBG (2020), yet history has shown that legal harmonisation of any kind can take years, even with central bank support and political motivation (eg the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). Yet an mCBDC arrangement based on compatible domestic systems could benefit from a clean slate. Systems could be designed with international standards in mind and encourage a diversity of private participants. There could be choice and competition within the arrangement and, together with private card networks, correspondent banking and closed loop networks, there could be choice and competition in the wider cross-border payment ecosystem as well. However, given that they resemble traditional cross-border payment arrangements, some of the same issues might apply. Specifically, even with potential for additional diversity, incumbent banks with large networks and foreign exchange operations may have an advantage, leading to the concentration seen in correspondent banking networks (Rice et al (2020). Beyond encouraging compatibility, central banks have more tools to influence payment arrangements and potentially avoid some of these outcomes. As an operator of the domestic CBDC system, they can interlink their system with others and provide more formality to an arrangement as well as safety features (eg payment versus payment (PvP) or efficiency (eg a common clearing mechanism), discussed in the next section. Linking multiple CBDC systems Linking payment systems is a complex task, often requiring compatibility measures. Payments have been compared to the “plumbing” of the financial system (Cunliffe (2020); an analogy for linking systems is connecting water pipes with different pressures or flow rates. Simply joining them together will not work. Valves and controls are required: contractual and operational arrangements are the equivalent for payment systems. In practice, this can take two forms: (i) a shared technical interface; or (ii) a common clearing mechanis
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