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SAFE LY NAVIGATING BUSINESS AT SEA 3 Safely Navigating Business at Sea 2 The sea is the engine of globalization and, as such, is intimately engaged with the financial sector and its institutions. As a result, the maritime sector itself is a complex commercial and financial ecosystem that includes transportation and infrastructure investment, insurance, trade finance, energy, supply chains, commodity exchange and security. Safely Navigating Business at Sea5 4 Safely Navigating Business at Sea Rear Admiral Chris Parry CBE PhD Managing Director, Merl House Strategic Forecasting and Risk INTRODUCTION For a long time, being out at sea meant being out of sight and out of reach, with the consequence that the remoteness and specialized character of activity at sea provided ample opportunities for criminal acts, not only piracy and slavery, but also violations of international law, sanctions breaches and trafficking of all kinds. In recent years, the maritime sector has benefited from more intrusive scrutiny and surveillance, principally from significant improvements in satellite coverage, communications 1 and innovative imaging technology, that now mean that it is increasingly difficult to escape notice on the high seas or in remote areas of ocean. In addition, the International Maritime Organizations International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea requires an Automatic Identification System (AIS) to be fitted aboard international voyaging ships with 300 or more gross tonnage (GT), and all passenger ships, regardless of size. This enables a great deal of information about ships, such as their location, course, speed and other characteristics, to be exchanged via satellite and viewed by subscribers. Meanwhile, specialist companies 2use artificial and other intelligence (AI) to interpret the visual images and profiles of ships at sea, with the ability to assess the tonnage of their cargo and their draft in the water by examining the shadow cast on the sea 3and by the shape of its wake. 4Another important implication of the vast amount of data available in real time to shipping companies and traders is that cargoes, especially oil and gas, can be bought and sold while in transit in response to market demand and shifting commodity prices. 5Satellite tracking is giving traders near real-time data on where oil and assets are located, their content and when they will arrive. This means they can respond much more quickly to sudden shifts in price and demand, but also means that trading across a rapidly shifting spectrum of ownership and assets offers opportunities for illicit activity. OUT AT SEA Satellite tracking is giving traders near real-time data on where oil and assets are located, their content and when they will arrive. Join the conversation: #FightFinancialCrime 1 Planet Labs a private space firm that has launched 331 satellites since 2014. 2 Such as TankerTrackers. 3 The fuller the vessel is, the lower it sits in the water. This metric determines the size of the shadow based on the sun”s altitude at the time. 4 In this way, ships involved in sanctions breaches with Iran and in delivering fuel oil to North Korea by offshore ship-to-ship transfer have been detected, sometimes actually in the act of transfer. 5 Vortexa applies AI to satellite and market data to interpret global energy markets.7 6 Safely Navigating Business at Sea Unfortunately, the complex, ambiguous character and international footprint of the maritime sector and its networks continue to frustrate attempts at the eradication of marine fraud and illegality. Even in an interconnected world, with its artificial intelligence-enabled information systems, sophisticated supply chains and extensive technological surveillance, there are numerous ways in which criminal and illicit activity still takes place, often within and at the edges of legitimate trading patterns. For example, although the IMO regulations require that AIS operates at all times, it is a simple matter for those ships engaging in illicit activity to switch off their AIS transponders for all or part of their transit. 6A typical case was reported by Reuters in March 2019. A super tanker, the Grace 1, had been undetected on AIS for two weeks (between Nov. 30 and Dec. 14, 2018). Its AIS eventually revealed that on 14 December 2018 it was near Bandar Assaluyeh in Iran and its draft indicated that its oil tanks were full. Between Jan. 16 and 22, 2019, it was transferring fuel oil to two smaller vessels off Fujairah (United Arab Emirates), which were full when they disengaged. Meanwhile, the Certificate of Origin of one of the smaller tankers claimed that that the oil had been obtained from Basra in Iraq. Investigation showed that the documentation had been forged, with faked signatures and loading dates for a ship that, according to port records and AIS, had not been in Basra. 7In a similar case, on March 2, 2019, a Royal Navy frigate discovered the North Korean-flagged vessel, the Saeboyl, conducting a prohibited ship-to-ship transfer at night “alongside a ship of unknown nationality” off the coast of Shanghai. 8The ownership profile of the Grace 1 highlights a major regulatory loophole, that of multiple ownership, of ships and cargoes. Although Panamanian-flagged, the Grace 1 was nominally managed by Singapore-based shipping services company whose offices could not be located. 9More widely, precise accountability for ships is often obscured by this complicated relationship between those entities and individuals who own, manage, lease or operate individual ships. CONTINUING RISKS 6 There are some exceptions. Warships, for example, are not always obliged to transmit on AIS 7 Reuters World News, March 28, 2019, Roslan Khasawneh, “Uncovering Iran”s Sanctions-Busting Sale of Fuel Oil on the High Seas.” (reuters/article/us-iran-sanctions-backstory-idUSKCN1R909T) 8 royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2019/april/05/190405-montrose-north-korea, accessed April 19, 2019. 9 Iships Management Pte Ltd.9 8 Safely Navigating Business at Sea Safely Navigating Business at Sea Indeed, the beneficial owner (“one who enjoys the benefit of a property of which another is the legal owner”) is often deliberately obscured, not least by the practice of shipowners establishing shell companies as the legal owners of their ships. In addition, the cargo or contents of a ship are likely (as we have seen) to belong to, or be held on account, by different companies, with the value traded (sometimes several times in whole or in part) even while a ship is on passage. Illicit practices at sea also rely on “flags of convenience,” the business practice of registering a merchant ship in a sovereign state different from that of the ships owners and flying that states civil ensign on the ship. It enables the owners to evade the more onerous safety, employment and regulatory requirements and enforcement mechanisms of their own state. Despite over a decade of regulatory pressure, it remains easy and inexpensive to establish a complex web of corporate entities to hide the identities of beneficial owners, especially those engaged in sanctions breaches and criminal facilitation. These almost impenetrable corporate structures are often multilayered and spread across numerous jurisdictions. Arms smuggling, money-laundering; trafficking in drugs, goods and people; and other illegal activities; as well as UN sanctions breaches; environmental damage; and illegal fishing, also thrive in the unregulated havens which the flag of convenience system provides. In addition, under flags of convenience, some ships are effectively low- wage “sweatshops,” in some cases meeting the definition of slavery, 10characterized by the evasion of labour regulation in the country of ownership, the payment of low wages in tandem with long working hours and unsafe working conditions. Another issue is that of “phantom” ships vessels without a valid or regular classification which are not registered with a recognized ship registry and which in many cases are operated by illegal or quasi-legitimate interests. Most phantom activities involve state- 10 The Philippines and China provide the greatest number of seamen to flag of convenience ships, especially to those registered in Panama, the Bahamas, Liberia and the Marshall Islands. On average, in some cases, Filipino and Chinese able seamen earned between 7 and 10 percent of the wages of their U.S. equivalents, while among chief engineers, Filipinos earned roughly 10 percent in comparison (The American Bureau of Labor Statistics: bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag483.htm, accessed March 17, 2019. 11 United Nations S/2019/171, dated March 5, 2019, reissued March 12, 2019 securitycouncilre- port/un-documents/document/s-2019-171.php). The purpose of the report was to highlight the pervasive use of ship-to-ship transfers in support of North Koreas attempts to import fuel oil, luxury goods and coal. sponsored or criminal networks in the theft or hijack of ships and their cargoes, with the aim of selling on, or utilizing for other uses, both the ship and her contents. Other cases involve straightforward ship identity theft. Their use is stimulated by corrupt or weak registration arrangements, poorly regulated flags of convenience regimes and the use of temporary front companies and financial transfer vehicles established simply for the period and purposes of specific transactions or operations. Unsurprisingly, a recent United Nations Panel of Experts (PoE) 11has reported sins of omission and weak compliance mechanisms within the financial community in relation to the maritime sector. It noted that “Global banks and insurance companies continue unwittingly to facilitate payments and provide coverage for vessels involved in ever-larger, multi-million dollar, illegal ship-to- ship transfers of petroleum products, as well as an increasing number of ship-to-ship coal transfers and attempted transshipments.” It highlighted the disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions and criticised “most global and regional commodity trading companies, banks and insurers, whose due diligence efforts fall extremely short.” In particular, “insurers do not monitor the AIS of the vessels for which they provide coverage and services.” Other methods of evasion included the physical disguise of North Korean tankers; the use of small, unregistered vessels; illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud; night transfers; and the use of additional vessels for transshipment. It also noted the extensive use of front companies and the establishment of accounts in multiple jurisdictions. Illicit practices at sea also rely on “flags of convenience”Safely Navigating Business at Sea Safely Navigating Business at Sea 10 11 The Trump administration has significantly stepped up pressure on illicit activity in the maritime sector, notably within the context of suppressing sanctions breaches associated with the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, with Iran and with North Korea. Intensified efforts since September 2018 have targeted Iranian, Russian and Syrian entities and their networks. In November 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a global advisory note directed at the petroleum shipping industry, describing the methods employed by sanctions evaders and proscribing 35 vessels. 12The advisory note also advertised the shipping registries of violating vessels, such as Panama, Liberia, Russia, Tanzania, Thailand, Namibia and several small island states, reminding them of their responsibility to uphold maritime law and monitor illicit activity. The Treasury also encouraged marine insurers to help deter sanctions busters by declaring that switching off AIS would invalidate or condition marine insurance cover. 13 INCREASED REGULATORY PRESSURE AND EXPOSURE TO RISK This initial salvo was followed up by two further Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) global advisory statements in March 2019. These, while increasing regulatory action in support of sanctions against North Korea and Syria, provided important general guidance for the maritime industry including shipping companies, shipowners, insurance companies, financial institutions with shipping practices, port operators and others in the sector on the scope of OFACs prohibitions, red flags for sanctions risks and the compliance practices that OFAC expected. In particular, the first note highlighted the misuse of AIS as a primary indicator and encouraged insurance firms to withdraw or invalidate protection and indemnity (P falsifying cargo and vessel documents; undocumented ship-to-ship transfers; and deliberately disabling the AIS. It extended the concept of Know Y our Customer (KYC) to the shipping industry, with due diligence covering: research into companies and individuals in the transactions; vessel owners and operators involved in contracts or shipments; country of origin and destination of goods involved in any underlying shipments, and the vessel history by IMO number. In addition, it introduced the theme of AML into the sanctions space by recommending AML/CTF due diligence; beneficial ownership transparency for legal entities; and the idea of a sanctions risk for underwriting, insurance or reinsurance for certain (Syrian and Iranian) maritime-related persons or activities. The novel aspect of these advisory notes was that, in contrast to its normal advisories that deal with financial flows, OFAC increased attention and pressure on nonbanking actors, reminding them that any sector could face sanctions- related risks. Of particular note was the emphasis in both advisories on the insurance industry, specifying due diligence measures that insurers should have been taking to mitigate risks. The U.S. Treasury and OFAC are now clearly sharpening their focus on several areas beyond financial services, including the maritime sector. 15 12 32 more ships were added in March 2019. 13 tradewindsnews/insurance/1738850/us-orders-marine-insurers-to-help-snare-sanctions- busters, accessed April 20, 2019. 14 OFAC, “Updated Guidance on Risks Related to Petroleum Shipments Involving Iran and Syria,” March 25, 2019. treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/syria_shipping_adviso- ry_03252019.pdf 15 In December 2018, U.S. Treasury Undersecretary, Sigal Mandelkar, identified detailed elements that the Treasury expects to see in OFAC compliance programs for all comp
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