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65BIS Annual Economic Report 2021 III. CBDCs: an opportunity for the monetary system Introduction Digital innovation has wrought far-reaching changes in all sectors of the economy. Alongside a broader trend towards greater digitalisation, a wave of innovation in consumer payments has placed money and payment services at the vanguard of this development. An essential by-product of the digital economy is the huge volume of personal data that are collected and processed as an input into business activity. This raises issues of data governance, consumer protection and anti- competitive practices arising from data silos. This chapter examines how central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) can contribute to an open, safe and competitive monetary system that supports innovation and serves the public interest. CBDCs are a form of digital money, denominated in the national unit of account, which is a direct liability of the central bank. 1 CBDCs can be designed for use either among financial intermediaries only (ie wholesale CBDCs), or by the wider economy (ie retail CBDCs). The chapter sets out the unique features of CBDCs, asking what their issuance would mean for users, financial intermediaries, central banks and the international monetary system. It presents the design choices and the associated implications for data governance and privacy in the digital economy. The chapter also outlines how CBDCs compare with the latest generation of retail fast payment systems (FPS, see glossary). 2 To set the stage, the first section discusses the public interest case for digital money. The second section lays out the unique properties of CBDCs as an advanced representation of central bank money, focusing on their role as a means of payment Key takeaways Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) offer in digital form the unique advantages of central bank money: settlement finality, liquidity and integrity. They are an advanced representation of money for the digital economy. Digital money should be designed with the public interest in mind. Like the latest generation of instant retail payment systems, retail CBDCs could ensure open payment platforms and a competitive level playing field that is conducive to innovation. The ultimate benefits of adopting a new payment technology will depend on the competitive structure of the underlying payment system and data governance arrangements. The same technology that can encourage a virtuous circle of greater access, lower costs and better services might equally induce a vicious circle of data silos, market power and anti-competitive practices. CBDCs and open platforms are the most conducive to a virtuous circle. CBDCs built on digital identification could improve cross-border payments, and limit the risks of currency substitution. Multi-CBDC arrangements could surmount the hurdles of sharing digital IDs across borders, but will require international cooperation. 66 BIS Annual Economic Report 2021 and comparing them with cash and the latest generation of retail FPS. The third section discusses the appropriate division of labour between the central bank and the private sector in payments and financial intermediation, and the associated CBDC design considerations. The fourth section explores the principles behind design choices on digital identification and user privacy. The fifth section discusses the international dimension of CBDCs, including the opportunities for improving cross-border payments and the role of international cooperation. Money in the digital era Throughout the long arc of history, money and its institutional foundations have evolved in parallel with the technology available. Many recent payment innovations have built on improvements to underlying infrastructures that have been many years in the making. Central banks around the world have instituted real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems over the past decades. A growing number of jurisdictions (over 55 at the time of writing) 3 have introduced retail FPS, which allow instant settlement of payments between households and businesses around the clock. FPS also support a vibrant ecosystem of private bank and non-bank payment service providers (PSPs, see glossary). Examples of FPS include TIPS in the euro area, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) in India, PIX in Brazil, CoDi in Mexico and the FedNow proposal in the United States, among many others. These developments show how innovation can thrive on the basis of sound money provided by central banks. Yet further-reaching changes to the existing monetary system are burgeoning. Demands on retail payments are changing, with fewer cash transactions and a shift towards digital payments, in particular since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic (Graph III.1, left-hand and centre panels). In addition to incremental improvements, many central banks are actively engaged in work on CBDCs as an advanced representation of central bank money for the digital economy. CBDCs may give further impetus to innovations that promote the efficiency, convenience and safety of the payment system. While CBDC projects and pilots have been under way since 2014, efforts have recently shifted into higher gear (Graph III.1, right-hand panel). The overriding criterion when evaluating a change to something as central as the monetary system should be whether it serves the public interest. Here, the public interest should be taken broadly to encompass not only the economic benefits flowing from a competitive market structure, but also the quality of governance arrangements and basic rights, such as the right to data privacy. It is in this context that the exploration of CBDCs provides an opportunity to review and reaffirm the public interest case for digital money. The monetary system is a public good that permeates peoples everyday lives and underpins the economy. Technological development in money and payments could bring wide benefits, but the ultimate consequences for the well-being of individuals in society depend on the market structure and governance arrangements that underpin it. The same technology could encourage either a virtuous circle of equal access, greater competition and innovation, or it could foment a vicious circle of entrenched market power and data concentration. The outcome will depend on the rules governing the payment system and whether these will result in open payment platforms and a competitive level playing field. Central bank interest in CBDCs comes at a critical time. Several recent developments have placed a number of potential innovations involving digital currencies high on the agenda. The first of these is the growing attention received 67BIS Annual Economic Report 2021 by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies; the second is the debate on stablecoins; and the third is the entry of large technology firms (big techs) into payment services and financial services more generally. By now, it is clear that cryptocurrencies are speculative assets rather than money, and in many cases are used to facilitate money laundering, ransomware attacks and other financial crimes. 4 Bitcoin in particular has few redeeming public interest attributes when also considering its wasteful energy footprint. 5 Stablecoins attempt to import credibility by being backed by real currencies. As such, these are only as good as the governance behind the promise of the backing. 6 They also have the potential to fragment the liquidity of the monetary system and detract from the role of money as a coordination device. In any case, to the extent that the purported backing involves conventional money, stablecoins are ultimately only an appendage to the conventional monetary system and not a game changer. Perhaps the most significant recent development has been the entry of big techs into financial services. Their business model rests on the direct interactions of users, as well as the data that are an essential by-product of these interactions. As big techs make inroads into financial services, the user data in their existing businesses in e-commerce, messaging, social media or search give them a competitive edge through strong network effects. The more users flock to a particular platform, the more attractive it is for a new user to join that same network, leading to a “data-network-activities” or “DNA” loop (see glossary). As cash use falls and digital payments rise, CBDC projects are moving ahead Graph III.1 Use of cash in daily transactions is falling 1 Rise of remote digital payments in the pandemic 2 Research and development effort on CBDCs % of retail transactions Ratio Number of instances 1 Based on volume of transactions. For AU, excludes payments over A$9,999. For JP, based on value of transactions; excludes retail payments by bank transfer. 2 Share of card-not-present transactions in overall transactions, based on transaction counts. These remote transactions are often for online sales (“e-commerce”). The sample comprises AR, AU, BR, CA, CH, DE, ES, GB, HK, IN, IT, JP, NL, RU, SE, SG, US and ZA. The black vertical line in the centre panel indicates 11 March 2020. 3 Based on publicly communicated reports. Cumulative count of scores in each bucket. The score can take a value of 0 when there is no announced project, 1 in case of research studies, 2 in the case of an ongoing or completed pilot and 3 for a live CBDC. For more information see Auer et al (2020). Sources: R Auer, G Cornelli and J Frost, “Rise of the central bank digital currencies: drivers, approaches and technologies”, BIS Working Papers, no 880, August 2020; F Alvarez, R Auer, G Cornelli and J Frost, “The impact of the pandemic on cash and retail payments: insights from a new database”, mimeo; central banks websites; Japans Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; global card networks; BIS calculations. 75 60 45 30 15 19171513110907 NL US Share of cash in retail transactions: GB JP EA AU 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 Q4 2020Q2 2020Q4 2019 Median Interquartile range 64 48 32 16 0 202120202019201820172016 Cumulative CBDC project score: 3 Research Pilot Live Retail: Wholesale: 68 BIS Annual Economic Report 2021 However, the network effects that underpin big techs can be a mixed blessing for users. On the one hand, the DNA loop can create a virtuous circle, driving greater financial inclusion, better services and lower costs. On the other, it impels the market for payments towards further concentration. For example in China, just two big techs jointly account for 94% of the mobile payments market. 7 Authorities have recently addressed concerns about anti-competitive practices that exclude competitors in associated digital services such as e-commerce and social media. 8 This concentration of market power is a reason why authorities in some economies are increasingly turning to an entity-based approach to regulating big techs, as a complement to the existing activities-based approach. 9 Entrenchment of market power may potentially exacerbate the high costs of payment services, still one of the most stubborn shortcomings of the existing payment system. An example is the high merchant fees associated with credit and debit card payments. Despite decades of ever-accelerating technological progress, which has drastically reduced the price of communication equipment and bandwidth, the cost of conventional digital payment options such as credit and debit cards remains high, and still exceeds that of cash (Graph III.2, left-hand panel). In some regions, revenues deriving from credit card fees are more than 1% of GDP (right-hand panel). These costs are not immediately visible to consumers. Charges are usually levied on the merchants, who are often not allowed to pass these fees directly on to the consumer. However, the ultimate incidence of these costs depends on what share of the merchant fees are passed on to the consumer indirectly through higher prices. As is well known in the economics of indirect taxation, the individuals who ultimately bear the incidence of a tax may not be those who are formally required to pay that tax. 10 The concern is that when big tech firms enter the payments Current forms of digital payments remain expensive Graph III.2 For merchants cash is still the least expensive payment option for a 25 transaction 1 Payment costs are higher in card-dependent regions 2 Marginal cost, EUR cents Payment revenues, percentage of regional GDP 1 Data for Europe (AT, BE, DE, ES, FR, GB, IT, NL, PL and SE), 2015. The graph reflects a scenario in which merchants were asked to assess fixed or variable costs for accepting cash, debit card and credit card payments for a 25 transaction over a three- to four-year time horizon. 2 Data for 2018. 3 AU, CN, HK, IN, ID, JP, KR, MY, NZ, PH, SG, TH and TW. 4 AT, BE, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SA, SE, SI, SK, TR and ZA. 5 AR, BR, CL, CO, MX and PE. 6 Includes revenue that may be considered an ancillary service (credit) rather than revenues from payment services, eg net interest income for revolving balances. Sources: V Alfonso, A Tombini and F Zampolli, “Retail payments in Latin America and the Caribbean: present and future”, BIS Quarterly Review, December 2020, pp 7187; European Commission, Survey on merchants costs of processing cash and card payments, March 2015. 35 28 21 14 7 0 Credit cardsDebit cardsCash Front office time Outsourced costs Other costs Back office labour Merchant service costs 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Asia-Pacific 3 US 7 = “complete trust”. 2 Survey of 27,000 respondents, FebruaryMarch 2019. BE includes LU. The question reads “I would be comfortable with my main bank securely sharing my financial data with other organisations if it meant that I received better offers from a) other traditional financial intermediaries, b) fintech companies, c) non-financial services companies”. Sources: O Armantier, S Doerr, J Frost, A Fuster and K Shue, “Whom do consumers trust with their data? US survey evidence”, BIS Bulletins, no 42, May 2021; S Chen, S Doerr, J Frost, L Gambacorta and H S Shin, “The fintech gender gap“, BIS Working Papers, no 931, March 2021. 6 5 4 3 2 1 FIsagency TraditionalFintechsGovernmentBig techs Interquartile range _ Median 60 45 30 15 0 FRBEDEGBRUZAUSBRCOPEAUHKCN NLSECHESIEITCACLARMXJPSGKRIN Asia-Pacific Americas Africa Europe Traditional FIs Non-financial services companies Fintechs 70 BIS Annual Economic Report 2021 government agencies and fintechs. Similar patterns are present in other countries (right-hand panel). The survey reveals a number of concerns, but the potential for abuse of data emerges as an important element. A later section of this chapter discusses data governance issues more fully. Digital money as a central bank public good The foundation of the monetary system is trust in the currency. As the central bank provides the ultimate unit of account, that trust is grounded on confidence in the central bank itself. Lik
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