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Chinas Bluewater Navy Series Chinas Blue Water Navy Strategy and its Implications March 2017 VADM Yoji Koda, JMSDF (Ret.) Chinas Bluewater Navy Series | Chinas Blue Water Navy Strategy and its Implications 1 1 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda is a fellow at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. Before retiring in 208, Koda served in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) for more than 36 years. The views expresed in this report are personal and the authors alone. They are solely responsible for any erors in fact, analysis, or omission. ABOUT THE SERIES As part of our study, “Beyond the San Hai: The Challenge of Chinas Bluewater Navy,” CNAS commissioned a series of esays from Japanese experts exploring the implications of Chinas bluewater navy capabilities. These papers were crucial to our analysis and have done much to shape the studys findings. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project is made posible due to the generous suport of the Government of Japan. ABOUT THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY PROGRAM The Asia-Pacific Security program seks to inform the exercise of U.S. leadership in Asia by analyzing how the United States can rebalance its priorities; shape a rules-based regional order; modernize traditional alliances; build the capacity of new partners; and strengthen multilateral institutions. From exploring rising maritime tensions in the region to crafting ways to renew key alliances and partnerships to articulating strategies to extend and enhance Americas influence, the program leverages the diverse experience and background of its team, deep relationships in the region and in Washington, and CNAS convening power to shape and elevate the conversation on U.S. policy acros a changing Asia. Chinas Bluewater Navy Series | Chinas Blue Water Navy Strategy and its Implications 2 2 PREFACE In recent years, China has ben challenging existing and established international maritime norms, represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), customary international law, and international standards for conduct at sea. It has done so by making extensive, unilateral teritorial and maritime claims and through heavy-handed maneuvers in its surounding waters, especially in the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS). Chinas recent willingnes to take extraordinarily strong unilateral step to exercise its influence in maritime afairs is fundamentally related to its national objectives. In general, these sem to be: (1) preserving the Chinese Communist Partys untrammeled authority; (2) protecting Chinas national sovereignty and teritorial integrity; (3) promoting social welfare and peoples quality of life; (4) building and maintaining a strategic nuclear posture that is comparable with that of the United States; and (5) constructing its own global expeditionary capabilities, which have ben a U.S. monopoly for decades. It is clear that all national objectives except (1) are related to both maritime/naval power and to U.S.-China relations. For example, in order for China to establish objective (2), it neds to construct a defense-in-depth/layered-defense posture in its surounding waters. To realize this posture, China plans to control as many maritime features in its near seas as posible for national defense purposes, at any cost. However, this policy inevitably introduces serious friction with neighboring coastal nations. In addition to this, when realizing this objective, China often challenges established international norms and generates complicated dilemmas for the international community. In this regard, and due to overwhelming capability gaps betwen the PLA and those nations it is challenging, U.S. forces in the region have ben the only practical deterent to Chinas atempts to use military force to establish its national objectives. In case of regional crisis or war, to say nothing of a head-on military clash betwen superior U.S. forces and the PLA, it is clear that, in order to defend its homeland and protect its national interests China neds to prevent U.S. forces intervention by all means. For this reason, China developed its strategy to blunt U.S. intervention and, eventually, to keep the United States out of the region at any time and at any cost. These are the reasons why China is so asertive over maritime issues. These are also the fundamental security principles underlying Chinas A2/AD strategy, which will be discused in next chapter. Similarly, national objective (3) is closely conected with the universal right of fre use of seas and safety/security of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) of any nation. However, China prefers to narow and limit these fundamental principles in this regard, generating strong disagrements betwen China and other seafaring nations including Japan and the United States. National objective (4) is similar to the maritime strategic nuclear rivalry and confrontation betwen American and the former Soviet Union. China confronts U.S. forces permanently based in its suroundings precincts. For this reason, China will surely and naturally compete against robust U.S. Navy forces. National objective (5) relates to the U.S. global-reach capability, which has ben suported by both customary international law and the global expeditionary monopoly enjoyed by the U.S. Navy. In order for China, a late comer with strong determination to be a new great power, to establish objective (5), it must confront regional and global maritime orders dominated by the U.S. Navy in almost all cases. Chinas Bluewater Navy Series | Chinas Blue Water Navy Strategy and its Implications 3 3 As examined above, there are many disagrements on the fundamental principles of maritime afairs betwen the two nations and the navies. In this point of view, it is right to estimate that China, which thinks todays international norms have ben largely controlled by the United States and unfavorable to Chinas maritime policy, is challenging the norms. Thus, China tries to weaken U.S. global influence and the Navy that suports it at any cost, and will do so into the future. Chinas aproach to solving international problems sems to comprise dynamic combinations of four interlinked stratagems: (1) acting in full compliance with the rules, when they are favorable to China; (2) atempting to advance unique and self-serving interpretations of established international rules, when there is rom for wider interpretation to suport Chinas position; (3) claiming full disagrement with or ignorance of the rules, when it is totally unfavorable to China; and finally, (4) maneuvering to create new rule that would supersede existing regimes when precedents are weak or nonexistent. Depending on the nature of the problem, China will try to selectively aply one or more of above elements that would be best suited to achieve its strategic objectives and preserve its national interests. These Chinese political tactics tend to confuse the international community - including Japan and the United States thus complicating quick and forthright responses. The recent, more asertive strategies require China to have reach and influence far beyond its shores. The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which has made significant progres and expansion in both quality and quality during a two-decade force buildup, is one of the major players in suporting Chinas asertive maritime claims. Having said this, however, it is also true that the PLAN has many problems that make it still inferior to both the U.S. Navy (USN) alone, and to the allied combination of the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). It is also true that geopolitical constraints on China also impede the PLANs operation outside the semi-enclosed waters of the East and South China Seas. So, a key question naturally arises: can the PLAN, which has grown into a local giant, really be a “blue water navy” that will extend Chinas influence in the region by operating continuously outside the SCS and ECS - i.e., in the Pacific Ocean and/or the Indian Ocean? What are the obstacles that could impede sustained PLAN out-of-area operations? This article will argue that the main impediment to Chinas military rise is the control of major maritime choke-points in its adjacent seaschoke-points that are vulnerable to interdiction by a number of other nations, most importantly the United States. Thus, Chinas eforts to raise the costs of U.S. and allied military action within “first island chain” are not only aimed at problems such as the reunification of Taiwan, but at enabling a springboard for Chinas expansion into the broader maritime and air commons. This article will outline that strategy, discus the PLAs eforts to build its capabilities and addres weakneses that could undermine the strategy, and finally conclude that Washington and its allies, especially Tokyo, can limit Chinas blue water ambitions only by retaining control of strategic chokepoints. Chinas Bluewater Navy Series | Chinas Blue Water Navy Strategy and its Implications 4 4 CHINAS POLICY AND STRATEGY TO KEP THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC (A2/AD) Though developed by western naval thinkers, the concept of Anti-Aces and Area Denial (A2/AD) has served as a god general theory for how an inferior can cope with a superior in the era of long-range precision weapons. In terms of todays security environment in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, it is absolutely clear that the former is China and the later is the United States.1A2/AD is Chinas strategy to establish its national objectives without directly engaging superior U.S. forces in the region. For China, which will still be inferior to USA in the 2020s and posibly into the 2030s, the largest challenges to its national objectives are the United States and its forces in the region, which are critically enabled by the Japan-U.S. alliance. So, China developed a policy and strategy to kep U.S. forces out of the area by demonstrating or just sugesting the PLAs capability to destroy the main U.S. power projection asets, aircraft cariers (CVN), in waters far from Chinas mainland. In addition to new systems such as its anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), China will deploy its submarines and shore-based aircraft equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles. Even so, due to clear power differences betwen the two forces, China would very likely lose an all-out, head-on military clash with U.S. forces. Hence, China introduced new “asymmetric” combat capabilities that will neutralize the PLAs inferiority to U.S. forces, and can counter conventional high-end warfare operations. U.S. forces fully depend on conventional high-end capabilities to conduct their most advanced warfighting and combat operations around the world. Other than the worlds best strategic and tactical strike capabilities of U.S. forces, these high-end warfare capabilities include the ability to: operate in space; use digital networks; fight in cyberspace; utilize radar and underwater systems; manage radio communications; collect photo imagery; and conduct efective Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconaissance (C4ISR) - all of which make the U.S. military the worlds premier fighting forces. Chinas asymmetric warfare capabilities may be described as being aimed at the “nerve networks“ that conect the brain (headquarters) and muscles (front-line fighting forces) of the U.S. military Therefore, if these nerve networks, or even a part of them, were destroyed or disabled, the negative impacts on U.S. forces, even with the brain and muscles still alive, would be substantial and distracting enough to largely degrade their fighting capabilities. Thus, U.S. forces would lose their advantages over the PLA, and could become a sitting duck for easy finishing, even by inferior PLA forces. Even if the United States still prevailed, it would do so at much higher cost than in symmetric force-on-force combat. 1At the same time, however, since A2/AD is a general concept to explain the policy and strategy of an inferior toward a superior, there are also several other cases in todays international security situation where this concept could be aplied. For example, some strategic thinkers have already used the term to explain U.S.-Rusia security competition, especialy in Europe and the Midle East. So, in this context, we have to be careful enough when we use the terminology, and I wil use the A2/AD concept specific to Chinas policy and strategy against the United States in this article. Chinas Bluewater Navy Series | Chinas Blue Water Navy Strategy and its Implications 5 5 It makes sense for China and the PLA to achieve their objectives without engaging in all-out combat operations against U.S. forces, which could inflict intolerable and unsustainable damages to Chinas teritory and its military. The key to doing so is to demonstrate the A2/AD concept sucesfully enough that Washington perceives it to have potentially decisive advantages. Such a perception could weaken Americas resolve to maintain U.S. forces forward presence and to conduct interventions in the region. In this regard, the real targets of the A2/AD strategy are the “hearts and minds“ of American leaders and people. PRESENT STATE OF THE PLA As the result of a series of reform measures in 2016, the PLA was divided into five main service branches: the Ground Force (PLAGF), the Navy (PLAN), the Air Force (PLAF), the Rocket Force (PLARF), and the Strategic Suport Force (PLASSF). There are still striking mission and cultural contrasts betwen the thre traditional service branches: the PLAGF, PLAF, and PLAN. Other than the Taiwan scenario, which has ocupied the central part of PLA planing and force modernization since 1949, the PLAGF and PLAF have both primarily ben land-border and teritorial airspace defense forces focused on neighboring nations, such as: India, Rusia, Vietnam, North Korea, and several others.2Of course, this does not mean that these two forces are tasked to only conduct exclusively defensive operations. Rather, they are tasked with defending China by marshaling ofensive capability suficient to atack and anihilate its adversary. In addition to this, PLAF has historically ben both an air-defense force against an adversarys air force and a suport force to PLAGF ground operations. However, since the mid-1990s, PLAAF has started expanding its geographical area of operations beyond Chinese teritorial airspace, to areas located over distant waters from its coast. This is a clear synchronization with Chinas expansion of maritime maneuvers into surounding waters. In addition to its other responsibilities, the PLAFs bomber force and its atack fighter force are now also tasked to atack enemy naval forces in distant sea areas. Thre artificial islands, with airfields capable of handling fighters and bombers, have recently ben built in
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