中国制造2025与美国工业的未来(英文版).pdf

返回 相关 举报
中国制造2025与美国工业的未来(英文版).pdf_第1页
第1页 / 共80页
中国制造2025与美国工业的未来(英文版).pdf_第2页
第2页 / 共80页
中国制造2025与美国工业的未来(英文版).pdf_第3页
第3页 / 共80页
中国制造2025与美国工业的未来(英文版).pdf_第4页
第4页 / 共80页
中国制造2025与美国工业的未来(英文版).pdf_第5页
第5页 / 共80页
亲,该文档总共80页,到这儿已超出免费预览范围,如果喜欢就下载吧!
资源描述
1 The Project for Strong Labor Markets and National Development is a project of the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship under Chairman Marco Rubio. It exists to build a hub for policy development oriented to the institutions of dignified work, strong families, thriving communities, and a unified nation. This includes strengthening small business and entrepreneurship, which are critical components to an agenda of national renewal. The Project may be contacted at Projectsbc.senate.gov, or at (202) 224-8495. 2 Introduction . 4 Chairman Rubio: Building the future America . 4 Executive summary . 6 The political economy of planning .10 Overview . 17 Definitions and methodology . 22 Industry analysis . 25 Aerospace . 25 New energy vehicles . 30 Next-generation information technology . 35 Advanced railway . 40 High-technology shipping . 44 Biotechnology . 47 Robotics . 51 Energy and power generation . 56 New materials . 59 Agricultural machinery . 63 Policy implications . 66 Corresponding response. . 67 Capital flows. . 67 Trade. . 69 Development. . 69 Tax. . 70 Small business. . 75 Labor market stabilization. . 77 Conclusion. . 77 3 This page left intentionally blank. 4 :The 21st-century economy has brought great challenges to American workers. For many, the American Dream of earned happiness the dream that my immigrant parents were able to pursue and achieve feels increasingly out of reach. The American people know something has gone wrong. Will our children inherit an America where stable, well-paying work is available only to the few, or to the many? Will our country look more like the land of shared opportunity that my parents found when they arrived, or will we become a stagnant nation fighting over how to divide up what little opportunity is left? We must deal with the American peoples concerns. The health of our nation rests on the foundation of dignified work, upon which we can build strong families, strong communities, and a unified and patriotic nation. Threats to American productivity, including threats to the jobs and wages of our workers and products of our small businesses, represent a threat to our national fabric. To restore faith in the American promise of earned success through dignified work, we must confront challenges to it directly. It is for this reason I have long pushed for a policy agenda to meet the needs of working families. From expanding the per-child tax credit for low- and medium- income families and subsidizing the employment of low-skilled workers, many of whom who have dropped out of the labor force, to promoting changes to our business tax code that put dynamism and investment first, throughout my time in office I have sought to help Americans face the challenges of today. That effort continues now. Confronting the great challenges of our time begins by understanding that many of the outcomes we hope to change are themselves consequences of our own choices, not the inevitable result of global or market forces. We live in the country and economy we, through our choices or unwillingness to choose, have built. We can decide to build something different. An honest assessment of the state of American workers and small businesses should include the effects of our decision to expand trade with China at the beginning of the 21st century. The main commercial goal was to promote better access to Chinas consumer markets for American companies and small businesses. This has not happened, however. High-end goods made by advanced manufacturing were the very products that America was supposed to make more of due to our competitive advantages in talent and capital. Instead, these products are increasingly being captured by China. The “Made in China 2025” industrial plan announced in 2015 by the 5 Chinese government makes their goal clear. China aims to become the global leader in innovation and manufacturing. This would be an unacceptable outcome for American workers. To drive our own development in a competitive, global economy, we must prioritize the high-wage industries of the 21 stcentury, to the benefit of American businesses, workers, and their families. Our national debate for how to compete in the global economy, however, has too often been restricted by the assumption that the only possible route ahead requires doubling down on the status quo of free trade for its own sake. In a globalized economy, high wages for American workers are not the natural outcome of expanding trade, especially when some trading partners do not abide by the rules that theyve agreed to. Free markets can be an unparalleled force for the creation of prosperity and wealth, but they produce in response to the terms theyve been given. Lately, success by these terms has been defined by the growth of financial services instead of applied research or advanced manufacturing. The conclusion we should draw from this evidence is that we have too often failed to make the well-being of working Americans the terms for market success. Setting new terms for our economy will strengthen the American system against its rivals, including an emergent and increasingly aggressive Chinese government and Communist Party. Though the Chinese governments model of centralized economic planning presents a formidable challenge, it is fundamentally flawed. The Chinese governments authoritarian system prioritizes the protection of the Communist Partys power above all else and leaves little room for the freedom and competition from which real and sustainable innovation, prosperity, and human dignity emerge. We must do the hard work of forging a new consensus based on the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in order to build a better America for future generations. It is what Americans have always done. The urgency of answering these questions is why I have formed the Project for Strong Labor Markets and National Development from my staff at the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. My hope is this report may contribute to this critical discussion. Sincerely, Marco Rubio Chairman U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship 6 1. Nations desire high-value, high-labor content production, and compete for industries and innovations that drive it. In a world of state competition for valuable industries, a domestic policy of neutrality is itself a selection of priority. “Not choosing” is a choice, however it is made. The critical policy consideration, then, is not whether states should organize their economies, but how they should be organized. 2. The Chinese governments whole-of-state industrial planning provides an extreme example of the inevitability of economic decision-making. National priorities exist prior to international law. International organizations may provide a mechanism to limit the negative externalities of pursuing these priorities, but they do not eliminate their underlying cause. 3. Existing characterizations of “industrial policy” do not apply cleanly in the 21 stcentury. Economic organization does not require picking “winners and losers” or protectionist self-sufficiency. Dynamism and exposure to the global economy can also be priorities of economic decision. 4. The goal of American economic policy should be to benefit working Americans and the families their earnings support. Taking this goal seriously requires making a priority of its secondary implications. For example: manufacturing generally provides more stable employment than services, and geographic proximity to large production facilities encourages small business dynamism. 5. The “Made in China 2025” industrial plan, which targets 10 high-value industrial sectors for global dominance, demonstrates that the Chinese government is doing more than merely “breaking the rules,” it is seeking to set new terms for international economic competition. 6. Evaluating the “Made in China 2025” plan should contribute to the American economic policy framework in two main ways. First, assessing the plans particular goals and progress toward them can identify areas for defensive action. Second, comparing areas of Chinas success to Americas relative decline can help identify areas for creative reform. 7. A common defense of expanded trade with China is that the U.S. would maintain or increase its position on the high end of the value chain, while China would supply the U.S. with lower-value inputs. This has not happened for the U.S. economy as a whole. In important areas, China has moved up the value chain relative to the U.S. 8. China has made gains vs. the U.S. in high-value sectors by various measures. Importantly, this has occurred in global export markets, which involve large scale and competition. China has significantly increased its export share of global markets since 2001 and aims for continued growth by this measure in the “Made in China 2025” plan. 9. Though its goals and progress vary, China has demonstrated clear success in information technology, shipping, and energy and power generation, while investing in large-scale projects in aerospace, vehicles, and robotics. 10. U.S. policy should respond to the practical and political economy challenges of the “Made in China 2025” plan. This includes enacting strategic U.S.-China capital flow restrictions and corresponding defensive measures for domestic industries targeted by the plan. It also means prioritizing new economic development, including encouraging physical investment and discouraging un-productive arbitrage through the tax code, and utilizing development assistance like the Small Business Investment Company and Small Business Investment Research programs. Finally, it means considering labor market stabilization policies to support Americans attachment to the labor force and accumulation of valuable skills. 7 This page left intentionally blank. 8 Figure 1. 11OECD, STAN Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-use Category (BTDIxE). stats.oecd/, accessed January 4, 2019. Motor vehicles Ships & boats Air & spacecraft Railroad equip. Machinery & equip. Fab. metal Motor vehicles Air & spacecraft Railroad equip. Machinery & equip. Fabricated metal products High R&D industry High R&D industry Ships & boats 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Increase in global exports by heavy industry (OECD) index, base year 2001 = 100 China U.S. 9 Figure 2. 22OECD, STAN Industrial Analysis. stats.oecd/, accessed January 4, 2019. Textiles Wood & paper Fab. metal Machinery & equip. Motor vehicles Construction Information & communication Finance & insurance Real estate Community, social, and personal services Inflation 50 100 150 200 250 1997 2016 U.S. total labor compensation by industry, 1997-2016 (OECD) Five highest growth and five lowest growth two-digit industries index, base year 1997 = 100 10 “If the system of perfect liberty to industry and commerce were the prevailing system of nations, the arguments which dissuade a country in the predicament of the United States from the zealous pursuit of manufactures would doubtless have great force But this system is far from characterizing the general policy of nations The regulations of several countries with which we have the most extensive intercourse throw serious obstructions in the way of the principal staples of the United States Remarks of this kind are not made in the spirit of complaint. It is for the nations whose regulations are alluded to, to judge for themselves whether, by aiming at too much, they do not lose more than they gain. It is for the United States to consider by what means they can render themselves least dependent on the combinations, right or wrong, of foreign policy” Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, submitted by the Treasury Department to the Congress December 5, 1791. 3“The health and vitality of the U.S. semiconductor industry are essential to Americas future competitiveness. We cannot allow it to be jeopardized by unfair trading practices.” President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Tariff Increases on Japanese Semiconductor Products, April 17, 1987. 43Alexander Hamilton, “Report on the Subject of Manufactures,” National Archives, December 5, 1791, founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007. 4President Ronald Reagan,
展开阅读全文
相关资源
相关搜索
资源标签

copyright@ 2017-2022 报告吧 版权所有
经营许可证编号:宁ICP备17002310号 | 增值电信业务经营许可证编号:宁B2-20200018  | 宁公网安备64010602000642