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April 2019 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures China Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Peoples Republic of China Mutual Evaluation Report 2019The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standard. For more information about the FATF, please visit the website: fatf-gafi. This document and/or any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. This assessment was led by staff of the International Monetary Fund, and adopted by the FATF at its February 2019 Plenary meeting. Citing reference: 2019 FATF-. All rights reserved. No reproduction or translation of this publication may be made without prior written permission. Applications for such permission, for all or part of this publication, should be made to the FATF Secretariat, 2 rue Andr Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France (fax: +33 1 44 30 61 37 or e-mail: contactfatf-gafi). Photo Credit - Cover: Getty Images FATF (2019), Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Peoples Republic of China, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, FATF, Paris fatf-gafi/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-china-2019.html1 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in China - 2019 FATF, APG and EAG 2019 Table of Contents Key Findings . 5 Risks and General Situation . 6 Overall Level of Effectiveness and Technical Compliance . 7 Priority Actions . 14 Effectiveness and Technical Compliance Ratings . 16 MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT . 19 Preface . 19 CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT . 21 ML/TF Risks and Scoping of Higher-Risk Issues . 22 Countrys Risk Assessment and Scoping of Higher Risk Issues . 26 Materiality. 27 Structural Elements . 28 Background and Other Contextual Factors . 28 CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND CO-ORDINATION . 41 Key Findings and Recommended Actions . 41 Immediate Outcome 1 (Risk, Policy and Coordination) . 42 CHAPTER 3. LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES . 49 Key Findings and Recommended Actions . 49 Immediate Outcome 6 (Financial Intelligence ML/TF) . 52 Immediate Outcome 7 (ML Investigation and Prosecution) . 69 Immediate Outcome 8 (Confiscation) . 79 CHAPTER 4. TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION . 89 Key Findings and Recommended Actions . 89 Immediate Outcome 9 (TF Investigation and Prosecution) . 92 Immediate Outcome 10 (TF Preventive Measures and Financial Sanctions) . 100 Immediate Outcome 11 (PF Financial Sanctions) . 107 CHAPTER 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES . 1132 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Peoples Republic of China - 2019 FATF, APG and EAG 2019 Key Findings and Recommended Actions . 113 Immediate Outcome 4 (Preventive Measures) . 114 CHAPTER 6. SUPERVISION . 131 Key Findings and Recommended Actions . 131 Immediate Outcome 3 (Supervision) . 133 CHAPTER 7. LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS . 155 Key Findings and Recommended Actions . 155 Immediate Outcome 5 (Legal Persons and Arrangements) . 156 CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION . 165 Key Findings and Recommended Actions . 165 Immediate Outcome 2 (International Co-operation). 166 TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX . 181 Recommendation 1Assessing Risks and Applying a Risk-Based Approach . 181 Recommendation 2National Cooperation and Coordination . 184 Recommendation 3Money Laundering Offence . 185 Recommendation 4Confiscation and Provisional Measures . 188 Recommendation 5 - Terrorist Financing Offence . 190 Recommendation 6 - Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing 192 Recommendation 7 - Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Proliferation . 195 Recommendation 8Non-Profit Organisations . 197 Recommendation 9Financial Institution Secrecy Laws . 200 Recommendation 10Customer Due Diligence. 201 Recommendation 11 - Record-keeping . 208 Recommendation 12 - Politically Exposed Persons . 209 Recommendation 13 - Correspondent Banking . 210 Recommendation 14 - Money or Value Transfer Services . 212 Recommendation 15 - New Technologies . 213 Recommendation 16 - Wire Transfers . 213 Recommendation 17Reliance on Third Parties . 217 Recommendation 18Internal Controls and Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries . 217 Recommendation 19 - Higher-Risk Countries . 219 Recommendation 20 - Reporting of Suspicious Transactions . 220 Recommendation 21 - Tipping-off and Confidentiality . 2223 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in China - 2019 FATF, APG and EAG 2019 Recommendation 22 - DNFBPs: Customer Due Diligence . 222 Recommendation 23 - DNFBPs: Other Measures . 226 Recommendation 24 - Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons . 227 Recommendation 25 - Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Arrangements. 230 Recommendation 26Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions . 231 Recommendation 27 - Powers of Supervisors . 237 Recommendation 28 - Regulation and Supervision of DNFBPs . 238 Recommendation 29 - Financial Intelligence Units. 240 Recommendation 30 - Responsibilities of Law Enforcement and Investigative Authorities . 245 Recommendation 31 - Powers of Law Enforcement and Investigative Authorities . 246 Recommendation 32 - Cash Couriers . 247 Recommendation 33 - Statistics . 250 Recommendation 34 - Guidance and Feedback. 251 Recommendation 35 - Sanctions . 252 Recommendation 36 - International Instruments . 256 Recommendation 37 - Mutual Legal Assistance . 256 Recommendation 38 - Mutual Legal Assistance: Freezing and Confiscation . 258 Recommendation 39 - Extradition . 260 Recommendation 40 - Other Forms of International Cooperation . 261 Summary of Technical Compliance Key Deficiencies . 267 Glossary of Acronyms . 275Executive Summary 1. This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures in place in China (China) 1 as at the date of the onsite visit (July 9 27, 2018). It analyses the level of compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations and the how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings a) China has undertaken a number of initiatives since 2002 that have contributed positively to its understanding of ML/TF risk, although some important gaps remain. Its framework for domestic AML/CFT co-operation and co-ordination is well established. b) -centralised FIU arrangement consisting of CAMLMAC, AMLB and 36 PBC provincial branches has high potential to produce financial intelligence that supports the operational needs of competent authorities but its current functioning results in incomplete access by all parts of the FIU to all data, a fragmented analysis and disseminations, and limits the development of a holistic view. Therefore, major improvements are needed. c) LEAs have access to and use a wide range of financial intelligence throughout the lifetime of an investigation, but financial intelligence is not driving ML investigations. When using financial intelligence, LEAs identify predicate criminal behaviours and actively investigate these. Predicate crime investigation outcomes reflect that China has capable LEAs that are skilled in the investigation of complex financial crime and associated predicate crime. Effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions are available and are applied for ML. d) China has an institutional framework in place to investigate and prosecute TF activities, in line with its understanding of TF risks and in line with its strategy to prevent TF and disrupt TF channels. Since the implementation 1 The following territories were not included as part of this assessment: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong, China), Macau Special Administrative Region (Macau China) and Chinese Taipei.6 6 FATF/ME(2019)5 6 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Peoples Republic of China - 2019 FATF, APG and EAG 2019 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of a new counterterrorism law in 2015 and related interpretations, the number of TF prosecutions and convictions has increased. e) The implementation of TF and PF targeted financial sanctions is negatively affected by three fundamental deficiencies, related to (i) scope of coverage of the requirements and a lack of a prohibition covering all persons and entities; (ii) the types of assets and funds of designated entities that can in practice be frozen, and the type of transactions that can be prohibited; and (iii) a lack of implementation without delay for non-domestic designations. That said, the CTL and relevant PBC Notice are a good starting point for future updates to the legal system in line with revised FATF standards, and to improve effective implementation. While not covered by the FATF standards, authorities have taken measures in relation to other aspects of UNSCRs related to DPRK. f) While FIs have a satisfactory understanding of their AML/CFT obligations, they have not developed a sufficient understanding of risks. Measures implemented to mitigate risk are generally not commensurate with different risk situations. g) T supervisory system is almost exclusively focused on the financial sector, as there are no effective preventive or supervisory measures in respect of the DNFBP sector. The PBC has an inadequate understanding of risks overall. Although their understanding of risk impacting the financial sector is adequate, its understanding of institution- rather than that of the authorities. h) China handles MLA and extradition requests in accordance with the procedures and standards for approval stipulated by domestic laws, bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions, but due to a complicated decision-making structure for providing MLA or executing extradition requests, it is often a protracted process. At the same time, China can arrange an expedited procedure for urgent requests or cases. There is an effective cooperation in some areas between China and some of its neighbours, however, there is a lack of data that would establish effective implementation of ML/TF related co-operation. Risks and General Situation 2. The main proceeds-generating predicate crimes in China are illegal fundraising, fraud, trafficking in illicit drugs, corruption and bribery, tax crimes, counterfeiting of products, and illegal gambling. 3. China faces a serious threat from terrorism. From 2011 to 2016, China registered 75 terrorist incidents that killed 545 people. The main conflict area and focus for the authorities is the northwest province of Xinjiang, from where the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) operates, but attacks occur7 FATF/ME(2019)5 7 7 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in China - 2019 FATF, APG and EAG 2019 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 7 throughout China. Around 60 people each year from China have participated as foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq 2 . 4. With total assets of approximately RMB 252 trillion, banks dominate financial sector activity in China. Based on nature of their products/services and volume of activity, they are considered to be highly vulnerable to abuse with respect to ML/TF. China has witnessed a rapid increase in the activity of online lending entities, primarily via mobile phone platforms 5. The lack of coverage of designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) by the AML/CFT framework is a significant vulnerability. The absence of coverage of domestic politically exposed persons (PEPs) is another significant vulnerability, which is particularly noteworthy in the context of a country where corruption is a major predicate offence and state-owned-enterprises play a dominant role in the economy. 6. A large amount of illicit proceeds flows out of China annually. As noted in the NRA, between 2014 and 2016, illicit proceeds totalling RMB 8 64 billion were repatriated to China from over 90 countries. China indicates that illicit proceeds also flow out of the country through underground banking operations. There are several instances in which criminals have fled the country, including suspects in corruption cases. The abuse of legal persons has also been identified as a method of laundering illicit proceeds. Such abuse is facilitated, in part, by ineffective arrangements in place for registering and retaining beneficial ownership (BO) information. Overall Level of Effectiveness and Technical Compliance 7. China has a good legal framework with respect to the criminalization of ML and TF, national coordination arrangements, the powers and responsibilities of law enforcement authorities and arrangements for international cooperation. There is scope for strengthening the legal framework with respect to a number of preventive measures and the coverage and supervision of DNFBPs. 8. An incomplete understanding of risk impacts negatively on the effectiveness clude the 2 See for example The Soufan Group Foreign Fighters Update Final 2015 ( but also see paragraph 230 of this report for other estimates (up to 300 persons).8 8 FATF/ME(2019)5 8 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Peoples Republic of China - 2019 FATF, APG and EAG 2019 8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY implementation of preventive measures by FIs, the supervision of these institutions and the investigation and prosecution of ML. Weaknesses in institutional arrangements and related practices impact negatively on the effectiveness with respect to the use of financial intelligence. 9. There are significant weaknesses in both technical compliance and effectiveness with respect to the transparency of legal persons and legal arrangements and the framework and practices related to targeted financial sanctions. Assessment of Risks, Coordination and Policy Setting (Chapter 2 IO.1; R.1, R.2, R.33) 10. Overall authorities in China demonstrated a strong understanding of the contents of the NRA which was finalized just prior to the on-site visit. However, given the focus of the NRA and the activity of LEAs, on predicate offences and the lack of attention to how the proceeds of crime are actually laundered, beyond those directly ved to a large extent, is hampered by such a focus. The assessment of risks of legal entities focuses on existing control measures. The TF assessment contained within the NRA is based mainly on qualitative analysis. The analysis collates information from departments involved in countering terrorism, primarily MSS, MPS and the PBC, identifying sources and channels of terrorist financing, and identifying the TF threats faced by Chi
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