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August 24, 2018 Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commissions website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.- China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, the public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commissions other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report. Alexander Bowe, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs Acknowledgments: The author thanks Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian for her helpful review of an early draft. Her assistance does not imply any endorsement of this reports contents, and any errors should be attributed solely to the author. Chinas Overseas United Front Work Background and Implications for the United States U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Table of Contents Executive Summary.3 Introduction .3 Background and Role of United Front Work .4 The United Front Work Department .4 Resurgence of the United Front under President Xi .5 Seeking to Control the Narrative .6 Focus on Influencing Overseas Chinese .7 Other Organizations Involved in United Front Work .8 The Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference .9 China Association for International Friendly Contact .9 Chinese Students and Scholars Associations .10 Confucius Institutes .12 United Front Activities in the United States and Other Target Countries .15 Funding of U.S. Academic and Policy Discourse .15 Political Interference in Australia and New Zealand .16 Political Warfare in Taiwan .18 Implications for the United States .19 Appendix .21 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 3 Executive Summary China uses what it calls “United Front” work to co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition to the policies and authority of its ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCPs United Front Work Department (UFWD) the agency responsible for coordinating these kinds of influence operationsmostly focuses on the management of potential opposition groups inside China, but it also has an important foreign influence mission. To carry out its influence activities abroad, the UFWD directs “overseas Chinese work,” which seeks to co-opt ethnic Chinese individuals and communities living outside China, while a number of other key affiliated organizations guided by Chinas broader United Front strategy conduct influence operations targeting foreign actors and states. Some of these entities have clear connections to the CCPs United Front strategy, while others linkage is less explicit. Organizations such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations are less directly tied to the main United Front- related organizational structure, but many of their activities and acceptance of oversight from the CCP shows some level of guidance from the United Front strategy. Today, United Front-related organizations are playing an increasingly important role in Chinas broader foreign policy under Chinese President and General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping. It is precisely the nature of United Front work to seek influence through connections that are difficult to publically prove and to gain influence that is interwoven with sensitive issues such as ethnic, political, and national identity, making those who seek to identify the negative effects of such influence vulnerable to accusations of prejudice. Because of the complexities of this issue, it is crucial for the U.S. government to better understand Beijings United Front strategy, its goals, and the actors responsible for achieving them if it is to formulate an effective and comprehensive response. This staff report provides an overview of the United Front, its history and ideology, the structure and operations of the UFWD and other organizations carrying out United Front work, and the implications of this activity for the United States. Introduction The CCP advocates for its political interests through the use of what it calls “United Front” work, a strategy borrowed from the former Soviet Union. 1President Xi has placed a greater emphasis on United Front work since assuming office in 2012, describing it as important for the “whole Chinese Communist Party” and elevating its role within Chinas broader foreign policy. 2At the national level, Chinas United Front strategy is “given concrete institutional form”according to June Teufel Dreyer, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Instituteby the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a critical coordinating body that brings together representatives of Chinas other interest groups and is led by a member of Chinas highest-level decision-making authority, the CCPs Politburo Standing Committee. 3At the operational level, United Front activities are coordinated by the CCPs United Front Work Department (UFWD), although a number of other organizations also play important roles carrying out United Front work abroad. 4The United Front strategy uses a range of methods to influence overseas Chinese communities, foreign governments, and other actors to take actions or adopt positions supportive of Beijings preferred policies. 5A number of official and quasi-official entities conduct overseas activities guided or funded by the United Front including Chinese government and military organizations, cultural and “friendship” associations, and overseas academic groups such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) and Confucius Institutes. 6The UFWD also oversees influence operations targeting Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau that aim to suppress independence movements, undermine local identity, and promote support for Beijings political system. 7In all of these cases, United Front work serves to promote Beijings preferred global narrative, pressure individuals living in free and open societies to self-censor and avoid discussing issues unfavorable to the CCP, and harass or undermine groups critical of Beijings policies. 8The CCP continues to lay the groundwork in the United States for United Front operations that could be similar to those that have achieved success in some U.S.-allied countries (e.g., Australia and New Zealand, where the CCP has effectively monopolized Chinese-language media outlets and taken over Chinese community organizations). 9The CCP has sought to influence academic discourse on China and in certain instances has infringed uponand potentially criminally violatedrights to freedoms of speech and association that are guaranteed to Americans and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 4 those protected by U.S. laws. 10Despite the CCPs candid discussion of its United Front strategy, the breadth and depth of this issue remain relatively unknown to U.S. policymakers. 11Background and Role of United Front Work United Front workwhich is inspired by the Leninist theory of uniting with lesser enemies to defeat greater ones has been a key element of the CCPs strategy to consolidate its hold on power, both domestically and internationally, since the Partys founding. 12The first incarnation of United Front work was an attempt to join and subvert the then ruling Nationalist government, the Kuomintang, in the early 1920s. 13The CCP then formed an alliance of convenience with the Kuomintang to discourage it from trying to wipe out the fledgling CCP while uniting their efforts against Japan. 14According to Gerry Groot, senior lecturer at the University of Adelaide and renowned expert on the United Front, this campaign evolved into a systematic effort to recruit “fellow travelers,” mostly “famous intellectuals, writers, teachers, students, publishers, and business people who were not necessarily themselves Communists.” 15Through co-opting or subverting potential opponents, the CCP has proven highly successful in neutralizing large-scale or open political opposition, including from religious groups and ethnic minorities, while incentivizing public displays of loyalty to the CCP. 16It is also trying to use this strategy against the rising Chinese middle class and other new groups of potential opposition. 17Since its early successes inside China, the CCP has extended its United Front work overseas to influence foreign individuals and the policies of foreign states to serve Beijings interests. 18According to a UFWD training manual from 2014 reviewed by the Financial Times, an important goal of United Front work is to “unite all forces that can be united” to thwart “enemy forces abroad.” 19Within China, United Front work is carried out by the CCPs United Front Work Department. The United Front Work Department The UFWD, which is the primary organization responsible for United Front work within China and United Front operations targeting Chinese communities abroad, *is a high-level Party body that reports directly to the CCPs Central Committee. 20The UFWD follows the direction of Chinas broader United Front strategy set forth by the CPPCC, a coordinating body led by a member of the Partys Politburo Standing Committee that brings together representatives of Chinas other interest groups under the CCPs overall leadership. 21The UFWD comprises four subordinate offices and nine specialized bureaus, each dealing with a particular targeted group such as Chinas eight officially-approved non-communist political parties, ethnic minorities, and Chinese communities overseas. 22President Xi recently expanded the UFWD by establishing two new bureaus. One, which targets representatives of the “New Social Classes,” is responsible for garnering support from Chinas new middle class, and the other cultivates loyalty and suppresses separatism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of western China, home to the Uyghur ethnic group and other Muslim minorities. 23*For more on United Front work targeting Chinese diasporas, see “Focus on Influencing Overseas Chinese Communities” below. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 Figure 1: United Front Work Department Organization Note: According to its website, the UFWD oversees the UFWD Organization Service Center, the Taiwan Guild Halls, the Huaxing Economic Advisory Service Center, Cadre Training Centers, the China United Front magazine, the China Tibet magazine, the Guangcai Program Guidance Center, the UFWD Information Center, the Taiwanese Classmates Academic Exchange Center, the Office of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification, and the High-Level Tibetan Buddhism College of China. Source: The United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Organization Structure, May 3, 2017. Translation. zytzb.gov/tzb2010/jgsz/201012/690112.shtml. Resurgence of the United Front under President Xi President Xi views United Front work as an important tool to strengthen support for the CCP both inside and outside China by exploiting individuals emotional and ideological sympathies for China and providing financial support to key groups and individuals. 24Although the importance of United Front work declined after the founding of the Peoples Republic of China, *a number of Western analysts agree it has regained its prominence since then, and especially since the rise of Xi Jinping, as Beijing has embraced a much more assertive approach to foreign policy. 25In his address to the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, President Xi called United Front work “an important way to ensure the success of the Chinese Communist Partys cause” and urged the CCP to form the “broadest possible patriotic United Front.” 26President Xi has also called United Front work a “magic weapon” that is important for bringing about “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 27This elevation of the importance of United Front work has resulted in an increased number of UFWD officials assigned to top CCP and government *Professor Groot argues Mao Zedong “lost interest” in United Front work after the mid-1950s because he preferred “class struggle” over conciliation, the latter of which is a necessary element of United Front co-option. However, according to Professor Groot, the CCP continued to rely on the United Front strategy to regain political stability each time it “had to recover from a Mao-induced crisis.” Gerry Groot, “The United Front in an Age of Shared Destiny,” China Story, 2014. thechinastory/yearbooks/yearbook- 201
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